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Justin T. Kingsland 
 
Abstract 
We conducted a survey experiment in which we presented 1,850 respondents with one of 
two versions of an appeal emphasizing either the threats to the environment or threats to 
national security of the United States as a result of climate change. The messages were 
attributed to one of four sources: Republican or Democratic party leaders, military 
officials, or climate scientists.  The results reveal that messages attributed to military 
leaders, or to Republican party leaders, can enhance the impact of the appeal.  This 
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 Americans report deep divisions along partisan lines over fundamental beliefs 
about whether human-caused climate change is real, the level of threat it poses, and 
whether there is a need for action to reduce greenhouse gases.  Despite an overwhelming 
scientific consensus that climate change is human-caused and presents a major threat to 
human societies and ecosystems (Cook et al., 2016), a significant percentage of 
Americans do not believe that climate change is occurring (30%) or that it is human-
caused (42%) (Leiserowitz et al., 2018; also see, Egan & Mullins, 2017).  Public 
discourse on climate change continues to be characterized by partisan and ideological 
divisions in the U.S. (Dunlap, McCright, & Yarosh, 2016; Feldman et al., 2012; 
Hamilton, 2016; Hart et al., 2015).  For example, one recent survey reported that while 
95% of liberal Democrats believe that human-caused climate change is real, only 40% of 
conservative Republicans say the same (Goldberg et al., 2019; Leiserowitz et al., 2018).  
An important challenge for science communicators is how to effectively engage 
individuals who reject information about climate change. 
Varying the way that climate change messages are framed – that is, varying the 
words, phrases or images that highlight specific aspects of climate change – has been 
shown to affect the response of various audiences (Feldman & Hart, 2018; 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Vaughan, 2013; McCright et al, 2016; Myers, Nisbet, 
Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2012; Nisbet & Mooney, 2007; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, & 
Maibach, 2019).  For example, a communicator might bring attention to the 
environmental, economic, public health, or national security implications of climate 
change, providing an “interpretive storyline that set(s) a specific train of thought in 
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motion, communicating why an issue might be a problem, who or what might be 
responsible for it, and what should be done about it” (Nisbet, 2009, p.15).   
A growing body of research has examined how exposure to issue, or emphasis, 
frames shape climate change beliefs (for a review, see Bolsen & Shapiro, 2017).  Yet 
little work explicitly manipulates the source of an appeal focused on shifting public 
opinion on climate change.1  Are framed messages more impactful when they are 
associated with an ostensibly credible source?  Does the presence of a partisan source 
manipulation (e.g., in-group versus out-group) condition the impact of the message?   
We extend research on issue framing and social identity theory to generate 
predictions about how the presence of a source cue (climate scientists, military leaders, 
Democratic Party leaders, or Republican party leaders) in an appeal highlighting either 
the environmental or national security effects of climate change conditions the 
effectiveness of an appeal.  We implemented a survey experiment to test how the 
presence of different sources conditioned a frame’s impact on individuals’ climate-related 
beliefs.  The results suggest that the presence of specific sources linked with frames 
highlighting different effects of climate change can increase or decrease the message’s 
impact on individuals’ related beliefs.  This underscores the importance that the source of 
any strategic climate communication effort can have on its overall effectiveness, as well 
as the need for credible and trusted opinion leaders to convey messages who have the 
capacity to persuade skeptical audiences.  
 
1 We discuss several exceptions below, including Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Ehret, Van 




Issue frames and climate change beliefs 
 A growing body of research has explored how exposing people to frames that 
emphasize different aspects of climate change shape citizens’ related beliefs and 
willingness to take actions that would reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Hart, 2011; Hart 
& Feldman, 2016; Hart & Nisbet, 2012; Maibach, Nisbet, Baldwin, Akerlof, & Diao, 
2010; Leiserowitz, 2007; Myers, Nisbet, Maibach, & Leiserowitz, 2012; Nisbet, 2009; 
Villar & Krosnick, 2011).  An issue or emphasis framing effect occurs when exposure to 
a communication causes an individual to place relatively greater “weight” on the 
emphasized consideration in the opinion formation process (Chong & Druckman, 2007).2   
Exposure to framed messages may increase the availability, accessibility, and/or 
perceived applicability of specific aspects of the complicated issue of climate change.  
Myers et al. (2012), for instance, tested how exposure to one of three distinct frames 
associated with the effects of climate change – national security, environment, and public 
health – affected self-reported emotions among respondents with different levels of pre-
existing skepticism about climate change.  They found that exposure to the public health 
frame increased feelings of hope whereas the national security frame unexpectedly 
increased anger among “doubtful” and “dismissive” audience segments.  Myers et al. 
 
2 We focus exclusively on issue framing effects and not equivalency, or valence, framing 
effects that occur when positive or negative information unconsciously influences 
preferences as a result of a negativity bias in the encoding of stimulus information 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; for a typology of framing effects, see Levin, Schneider, & 
Gaeth, 1998).  
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(2012) stated that one factor that might have accounted for this “boomerang effect”3 was 
the lack of the congruence between the messenger and the frame.  They posited that 
participants may have experienced anger at the experimenters for making claims about 
the national security implications of climate change, and called for future work to explore 
the role that the presence of sources linked with specific frames might have on different 
audiences.  
 Frames that accentuate scientific consensus among climate scientists regarding 
the existence of human-caused climate change have been found to increase belief in 
human-caused climate change and support among Americans for policy action to address 
the problem (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; van der Linden, 2015; van der Linden et al., 
2019).  Other studies have demonstrated that highlighting its local impacts, for instance 
through visual images showing flooding that would occur as a result of sea level rise in 
coastal communities, can increase public concern and support for actions to address the 
problem (Bolsen, Kingsland, & Palm, 2018).  However, response to otherwise credible 
and persuasive information can be undermined when presented in competition with 
rhetoric that politicizes climate science, for instance by actors seeking to cast doubt on 
the existence of a scientific consensus.  (Bolsen & Druckman, 2018; Druckman, 2017; 
McCright & Dunlap, 2011; McCright et al., 2016; van der Linden et al., 2017).   
 
 
3 Hart and Nisbet (2012, p. 704) state, “A boomerang effect occurs when a message is 
strategically constructed with a specific intent but produces a result that is the opposite of 
that intent”; (for other examples of such effects in climate communication studies, see 
Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; Myers et al., 2012; Zhou, 2016).   
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Source credibility, trust, and persuasion 
 While a number of experiments have documented the impact of exposure to 
strategic frames on Americans’ climate beliefs, few studies have varied the presence of 
sources linked with a pro-climate action message to determine if such information 
moderates a frame’s impact on individuals’ climate beliefs.  Research on environmental 
risk communication and issue-framing makes clear that the effectiveness of any message 
depends crucially on the audience’s trust in and perception of credibility toward its 
source (Brewer & Ley, 2013; Druckman, 2001a; 2001b; Liu & Priest, 2009; Priest, 2001; 
Renn & Levine, 1991).  Perceptions about the competence, expertise, objectivity, 
impartiality, and fairness of a message’s source determine its persuasive impact, as well 
as other more peripheral factors such as the attractiveness of the source, sympathy or 
empathy toward the source, and social status of the source (Renn & Levine, 1991).   
 The “elaboration-likelihood model of persuasion” (ELM) has been applied by 
social scientists across disciplines to understand the mechanisms by which risk 
communication can generate persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  The ELM 
distinguishes between central and peripheral routes of persuasion.  The peripheral route 
involves the use of heuristics – such as the perceived credibility of a messenger – in 
determining whether or not to accept a particular message; the central route is 
characterized by more effortful information processing triggered by the motivation of an 
individual to actively process the information (Brewer & Ley, 2013; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Renn & Levine, 1991).  
Finally, empirical research has demonstrated the credibility of “scientists” as 
generally credible sources.  Surveys conducted in both the U.S. and among British 
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citizens has demonstrated that “scientists” tend to be among the most trusted sources for 
providing accurate information about environmental issues in general and on climate 
change in particular (Bickerstaff et al., 2008; Malka, Krosnick, & Langer, 2009; Nisbet & 
Myers, 2007).4   
 
Based on this literature, we hypothesize: 
 The presence of a credible source linked with a frame congruent with the 
 expertise attributed to this source will increase the frame’s impact on individuals’ 
 beliefs. Specifically, climate scientists linked with a frame highlighting climate 
 change’s environmental effects will increase the frame’s impact on individuals’ 
 related beliefs. (Hypothesis 1) 
Similarly, military leaders linked with a frame that emphasizes climate change’s 
effects on U.S. national security will increase the frame’s impact on individuals’ 
related beliefs. (Hypothesis 2)  
Social identity theory and climate change beliefs 
 People derive their self-concept, in part, from the social groups and categories to 
which they belong (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Huddy, 2001; Huddy, Mason, & Aaroe, 2015; 
Kahan, 2016).  These group attachments play a powerful role in shaping determinations 
about the credibility and trust of any information source (Lenz, 2012; McCright, 
 
4 Partisanship, however, increasingly plays a role in perceptions about the credibility of 
scientific information (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Gauchat, 2012; Motta, 2017), so it may 
be that on a polarized issue such climate change some groups (e.g., Republicans) may not 
find scientists to be the most effective source of any pro-climate appeal.  
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Dentzman, Charters, & Dietz, 2013; Renn & Levine, 1991).  Identity-based motivated 
reasoning can lead audiences to interpret information about climate change in a biased 
manner as a way to protect their existing beliefs or group attachments (Hart & Nisbet, 
2012; Kahan et al., 2011).   
One form of protection of social identity is the use of partisan motivated 
reasoning (for a review, see Druckman, Leeper & Slothuus, 2018; Taber & Lodge, 2013; 
Kahan, 2015). This process can occur when people possess strong opinions that guide 
their reasoning strategies, or because of partisan cue-taking that simplifies and reduces 
the amount of information and effort necessary to form an opinion in a given context 
(Bartels, 2002; Bolsen, Druckman, & Cook, 2014; Cohen, 2003; Goren et al., 2009; 
Guber, 2017; Kunda, 1990; Lelkes, Malka, & Bakker, 2019; Malka & Lelkes, 2010). 
Partisans in pursuit of value-affirming information may therefore turn to sources who 
share their group identity or cultural worldviews in seeking out or interpreting any new 
information about climate change (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Feinberg & Willer, 2013; 
Hmielowski et al., 2014; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011)  
Perception of consensus, particularly within ones’ close social network, also 
influences people to align their beliefs with what they perceive to be the majority point-
of-view (Goldberg et al., 2019; Jost, 2018; van der Linden 2015).  However, Americans 
tend to underestimate the actual level of social consensus about human-induced climate 
change (Mildenberger & Tingley, 2017).  Empirical research has identified the power of 
social consensus messages particularly among conservatives and Republicans.  These 
groups show a stronger drive for conformity to in-group norms and greater willingness to 
adopt and share like-minded views with other Republicans (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; 
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Goldberg et al., 2019; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos & Hardin, 2018). In a recent 
experiment that varied sources associated with a ballot proposal, Republicans were more 
likely to support a climate proposal when it was endorsed by Republican party elites, and 
perceptions that other Republicans also supported the initiative was a key mediating 
belief (Ehret, Van Boven, & Sherman, 2018).  In another recent study, a message 
sponsored by Republican senators led Republican respondents to reject misinformation 
about climate change, increase their belief in the existence of a scientific consensus, and 
increase their belief that it is human-caused (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018).  In these cases, 
the partisan membership of the person delivering the message plays a powerful role in the 
degree to which an appeal persuades any audience (Benegal & Scruggs, 2018; Ehret, Van 
Boven, & Sherman, 2018; Kousser & Tranter, 2018; Li et al., 2016; Maibach et al., 2015; 
Van Boven, Ehret, & Sherman, 2018).   
Based on the findings of these studies, we hypothesize that: 
The presence of an in-group (i.e., in-partisan) source regardless of the frame with 
which it is associated will increase the frame’s impact on in-partisans’ related 
beliefs.  
  (Hypothesis 3) 
 
 
Data and methodology 
 
 We conducted a survey of 1,850 unique respondents recruited using Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) service in July 2018.5   Each participant was randomly 
 
5 MTurk samples offer greater diversity than student or other convenience samples and 
have been used to replicate numerous studies across disciplines (Berinsky et al., 2012; 
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assigned to one of ten conditions that varied the content of an appeal accentuating either 
the environmental or national security risks of climate change (i.e., environmental or 
national security frame). Two treatments were defined: one based on the threat that 
climate change poses to the national security of the United States, and the second that 
climate change poses for environmental sustainability.  The national security treatment 
emphasized the effects of climate change on human migration patterns and potential 
“conflict over land ownership or water use that could result in war,” while the 
environmental treatment emphasized coastal flooding due to sea-level rise and an 
increased frequency of droughts and wildfires.  In addition to highlighting these effects, 
both treatments advocated action “to promote energy efficiency and renewable energy to 
substantially decrease our greenhouse gas emissions.”6 We selected the environmental 
frame given its dominance in climate discourses and the national security frame given the 
and the call to link it with a credible source (e.g., Myers et al., 2012). The frames also 
matched the domain of expertise for two of the sources we manipulated in the study.  
  To test the impact of the source, we assigned respondents to one of five groups.   
For instance, the headline above the article in the no source (baseline) condition stated, 
“Call for Action on Climate” and did not explicitly mention a source, whereas the other 
conditions linked the appeal to a specific source – e.g., “Climate Scientists, Republican 
Party Leaders, Democratic Party Leaders, or Military Leaders.”  The appeal itself stated 
 
Mullinix et al., 2015). Descriptive statistics for the sample are available in a 
supplementary file available upon request.   
6 The complete wording of the stimuli for each condition and the survey instrument is 
available upon request.  
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that “Democratic Party leaders,” “Republican Party leaders,” “military leaders,” or 
“climate scientists” were the ones highlighting these effects of climate change and calling 
for policy action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
 We measured how exposure to the treatments affected individuals’ beliefs about: 
(a) the level of threat that climate change presents to national security (1-5 scale, none at 
all / a great deal); (b) the level of threat that climate change presents to a sustainable 
environment (1-5 scale, none at all / a great deal); and, (c) support for laws that promote 
energy efficiency and renewable energy as a way to combat climate change (1–7 strongly 
oppose / strongly support).  The information that was employed across experimental 
conditions highlighted one of these threats and called for a greater reliance on renewable 
energy.  As such, these measures serve as our primary dependent variables to evaluate 
how message sources condition an appeal’s impact.   
 We also included several additional post-treatment measures.  First, we measured 
fundamental beliefs about climate change: (d) whether or not they believe climate change 
is happening (1-7 Definitely not happening / definitely happening) and (e) the extent to 
which they agreed with a statement that a scientific consensus exists regarding climate 
change happening primarily as a result of human activity (1-7 strongly disagree / strongly 
agree).  Because our experiment explicitly manipulated the source of the message 
highlighting the threats of climate change and need for policy action, we measured 
respondents’ perceptions about (f) the degree to which political motives are a driver of 
scientific research on climate change (1-7 strongly disagree / strongly agree). We 
anticipate that audiences predisposed toward climate skepticism (e.g., Republicans) may 
view messages from in-group sources about climate change as “less politicized” 
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compared to the same message without a source (or when attributed to an out-party 
leader).  Last, we measured respondents’ agreement with the statement (g) that the idea 
climate change is primarily due to human activity is a hoax or a conspiracy (1-7 strongly 
disagree / strongly agree). We included this item given the literature showing that 
motivated reasoning processes appear to drive the expression of this relatively 
widespread belief held by many Americans (i.e., estimated between 20%–40%) regarding 
climate change (e.g., see Miller, Saunders, & Farhart, 2016; Uscinski, Klofstad, & 
Atkinson, 2016; Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  We anticipate similar dynamics resulting 
from the source manipulation on climate hoax belief as with the other key measures – i.e., 
credible sources, or in-group/out-group sources, linked to an appeal highlighting the 
threats of climate change will condition the impact of each message. Although belief in 
conspiracies is a general predisposition (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; 
Oliver & Wood, 2014), political ideology is strongly associated with which conspiracies 
an individual will endorse (Uscinski & Parent, 2014).  We expect that in-group sources 
linked with a message highlighting climate change’s threats will decrease climate hoax 
beliefs, whereas out-group sources may increase such beliefs among skeptical audiences 
(i.e., Republicans who receive a message sponsored by Democratic Party leaders) as a 
result of partisan motivated reasoning.  We measured party identification on a 7-point 
Likert scale, and then created a series of dummy variables for respondents who identified 
as Democrat, Independent, or Republican.  
 Before turning to the results of our analyses, we include a condensed description 
of our research design. Table 1 presents the framework of our experimental design, a 
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description of the treatments provided to respondents in each condition, and a restatement 
of our hypothesized expectations.  
    [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Results 
 We evaluate the impact of the experimental treatments by regressing each 
dependent variable on the experimental conditions, omitting the no-source appeal as the 
baseline for each distinct appeal.7 Our design allows us to evaluate the effects of the 
presence of two ostensibly credible, “expert” sources associated with each frame as well 
as the impact of Republican and Democratic Party leaders.    
 The first column in Figure 1 reports the impact of the experimental conditions on 
belief that climate change presents a threat to U.S. national security.  First, in support of 
Hypothesis 1, military leaders as the source of the message emphasizing climate change’s 
threats to national security significantly increase the belief that climate change is a 
national security threat across all respondents in the sample relative to the no-source 
baseline (p = .04).  We did not anticipate any effect of military leaders as the source of 
the environmental message (Column 2, Figure 1) on beliefs that climate change presents 
a threat to national security; however, as Figure 1 reports, military leaders linked with 
this frame also significantly increased beliefs that climate change is a threat to national 
security relative the no-source baseline (p = .01).  Military leaders did not have an effect 
on perceptions about the degree to which climate change presents an environmental threat 
 
7 We report the means and standard deviations for each condition across all of the 
dependent variables in a supplementary file available upon request from the 
corresponding author.   
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relative to the no-source baseline for that message.  This suggests that the impact of a 
source may depend on the degree to which the belief measured is in a domain in which 
the source is perceived as an expert.  Interestingly, in the full sample, military leaders 
linked with a national security frame had no effect on support for a greater reliance on 
renewable energy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (Support Laws), as well as other 
beliefs we measured such as the belief climate change is happening, that a scientific 
consensus exists, or that climate change is a hoax.  
    [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 The right side of Figure 1 reports the effects of the experimental conditions on 
respondents’ belief that climate change presents a threat to a sustainable environment.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that climate scientists linked with an environmental message 
would increase this message’s impact relative to the no source baseline.  We find no 
support for this hypothesis.  We also find that when climate scientists are the source of a 
message about the threat that climate change presents to national security and linked with 
a call for policy action, respondents significantly reduced the strength of their beliefs 
about the environmental threat climate change poses (p = .03), support for laws to 
promote renewable energy (p = .04), belief that climate change is happening (p = .01), 
and belief that a scientific consensus exists (p = .01).   
 The effects are even more dramatic when partisan information sources are 
compared with the no-source baseline on the full sample.  First, when Republican Party 
leaders are the source of the national security climate message, respondents increase 
their support for polices that would promote renewable energy to reduce greenhouse 
gases (Support Laws) (p = .08). Republican sources linked with a national security 
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message reduced the perception that climate change research is driven primarily by 
political motivations (p = .01).  Further, Republican sources linked with this frame and 
call for action also significantly decreased respondents’ perception that human induced 
climate change is a hoax by nearly a one-half point shift on the five-point response scale 
(p = .02).  Source effects were more prominent in the national security frame conditions 
compared to the environmental frame conditions.  Nonetheless, when the environmental 
message was attributed to Republican sources, respondents’ perceptions that a scientific 
consensus exists on human-caused climate change increases (p = .09).  On the other hand, 
when the source of the national security message and call for action is attributed to 
Democratic leaders, respondents became significantly less likely to see climate change as 
a security threat (p = .10) and significantly less likely to say that climate change is 
occurring (p = .03) or that a scientific consensus exists (p = .06). 
 To evaluate Hypothesis 3 regarding how in-group versus out-group partisan 
sources may condition the impact of the experimental conditions on our dependent 
measures, we replicate the analyses separately for Republican and Democrats in our 
sample.8  First, we found very few significant treatment effects resulting from the source 
manipulations when comparing Democrats in the no-source baseline condition to 
 
8 We chose this modeling approach rather than testing models with interaction effects 
because we are interested (theoretically) in testing for source-effects associated with the 
frames we introduce on Democrats (Republicans) in each condition relative to Democrats 
(Republicans) in the No-Source baseline condition to examine within-subgroup effects. 
We lack clear theoretical expectations for other estimation approaches that would rely on 
Independents in the No-Source condition as a baseline for our hypothesis tests.  
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Democrats across all other conditions (see Table 2 and Figure 2).  There are a few 
exceptions, such as military leaders having a significant positive effect on Democrats’ 
perceptions climate change is a national security threat, but the overall picture is that 
Democrats in the baseline condition (and all source conditions) report highly skewed 
beliefs that resulted in ceiling effects with little room for additional movement on many 
of the response scales.   
    [Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 here] 
 Republicans tend to be more skeptical about climate change and less supportive of 
laws to reduce greenhouse gases.  However, we find that when Republican Party leaders 
are the source of the environmental threat message, Republican respondents significantly 
increased their belief that climate change is an environmental threat (Table 3, Model 2, p 
= .03), that a scientific consensus exists (Table 3, Model 6, p = .04), and support for 
polices that would increase a reliance on renewable energy to decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions (Table 3, Model 4, p = .09).  When Republican Party leaders are linked with 
the national security message it significantly reduced Republicans’ perceptions that 
climate change research is politically motivated by nearly a full point on the response 
scale (Table 3, Model 1, p = .01) and decreased perceptions among Republicans that 
evidence regarding climate change is a conspiracy or hoax (Table 3, Model 1, p = .09).  
     
    [Insert Table 3 here] 
 On the other hand, we find that when Democratic Party leaders are linked with the 
environmental threat appeal, Republican respondents report significantly greater 
perceptions that climate change research is politically motivated (Table 3, Model 1, p = 
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.05), and become significantly more convinced that climate change a hoax (Table 3, 
Model 1, p = .05).  In contrast, when Republican Party leaders are associated with the 
national security message, Republican respondents were significantly less likely to 
perceive climate science research as driven by political motivations (Table 3, Model 1, p 
= .01).  
Discussion and Conclusions 
 The U.S. public remains polarized along partisan and ideological lines on the 
issue of human-induced climate change.  Science communicators and others who seek to 
build greater consensus thus face challenges both in securing the public’s attention to 
important information (Lupia, 2013), as well as motivating skeptical audiences to 
evaluate information in an “even-handed” manner with the goal of arriving at an 
“accurate,” or correct, conclusion (Druckman, 2013; Druckman & Lupia, 2017).   
 We investigated an approach to communicating information about climate change 
that involved manipulating the source of a message, while holding the content of the 
message constant.  We find that the presence of military leaders as a source of a pro-
climate appeal can significantly strengthen its persuasive impact, especially in the case of 
an appeal emphasizing the effects of climate change on U.S. national security. 
Republican Party leaders also enhanced the effectiveness of a frame both on average and 
among in-group respondents, perhaps due to the surprising effect that unconventional or 
unexpected sources of information can have in terms of its persuasive impact.  Partisans 
making statements that do not align with their perceived group’s position may draw 
greater attention to the frame’s content, may be seen as a “costly” signal thereby 
enhancing its perceived honesty and credibility, or may reduce identity protective forms 
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of motivated reasoning that would otherwise lead to the rejection of arguments related to 
a polarized and highly salient issue such as climate change (Bengal & Scruggs, 2018; 
Druckman & McGrath, 2019; Kahan et al., 2011; Kahan, 2015).  
On the other hand, we found a perhaps surprising impact of one information 
source: climate scientists.  When climate scientists were linked with the national security 
message it significantly reduced respondents’ perceptions about the threat of climate 
change to national security, support for policy action, and perceptions of a scientific 
consensus.  Indeed when messages were attributed to climate scientists, they either had 
no effect on most of the variables we tested, or their effect was a negative one.  The call 
by the American Meteorological Society for more engagement in policy communication 
by climate scientists (https://amspolicyforum.org/index.cfm/amspolicyforum/), suggests 
the need for more interdisciplinary communication between climate scientists and those 
who study the efficacy of message communication.  Dissonant science messages may 
threaten in-group identity (Dixon, Hmielowski, & Ma, 2017), leading to resistance and a 
greater distrust and negative affect toward scientists, and less support for action to 
address climate change (Dixon & Huber, 2018; Nisbet et al., 2015).  Targeted frames, 
however, that emphasize free-market solutions have been found to increase acceptance of 
climate science among conservatives (Campbell & Kay, 2014; Dixon et al., 2017).   
 We also find that there are circumstances under which skeptical audiences will be 
more open to climate change policy information. Republicans who received an 
environmental threat message sponsored by Republican Party leaders increased the 
strength of their belief that climate change poses a threat to sustainable environment, their 
support for laws to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and their beliefs that a scientific 
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consensus exists regarding human activities being the primary cause of climate change.  
Similarly, Republicans who received a national security threat message sponsored by 
Republican Party leaders were less likely to state that climate change research is driven 
by political considerations, and reported significantly lower perceptions that climate 
change is a conspiracy or hoax.  This clearly demonstrates the power that trusted in-group 
(i.e., in-party leaders) sources could play in overcoming hurdles posed by partisan 
polarization on climate change.  On the other hand, we find that when the source of the 
environmental threat message is Democratic Party leaders, Republicans become 
significantly more likely to report that climate change research is driven by political 
motivations and more likely to say that climate change is a hoax. The source of an 
identical appeal thus has a powerful impact on how the information affects individuals’ 
beliefs not only about the threats that climate change presents and willingness to support 
policy action, but also on broader perceptions about the motivations of climate change 
research, and even beliefs that climate change is a hoax. This is a finding that should 
prompt further exploration. 
 Future research should also explore the generalizability of our findings and the 
impact of varied sources associated with climate change information across different 
populations and using different content messages (e.g., highlighting the source of 
information on scientific consensus reports or public health considerations). The results 
we report are encouraging insofar as we show that sources perceived to be credible and 
trusted and that deliver climate change messages to skeptical audiences can break through 
the barriers that impede communication efforts.  
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 This paper highlights the role that credible sources can play in shaping skeptical 
audiences views about climate change and overcoming partisan barriers that impede 
efforts to generate greater consensus among the U.S. public. The finding that Republican 
Party leaders, and military leaders, had the strongest effect, on average, at enhancing the 
framed messages suggests that source credibility may increase when an “unconventional” 
position is taken by group leaders (Prior, Partridge, & Plant, 2014).  The finding that 
climate scientists had little effect, or at worst a negative effect, also needs further 
attention.  More exploration is necessary to understand the efficacy of source credibility 
linked with distinct arguments on climate change as well as the duration and persistence 
of efforts to overcome polarization and foster consensus and climate engagement.  
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Table 1. Experimental Design and Predictions 
 
Condition Treatment Predicted outcome 
National 
Security 
 (No source) 
(N=184) 
Some groups have recently argued that droughts and 
flooding caused by climate change are a threat to the 







A group of military leaders including generals and 
homeland security officers have recently argued that 
droughts and flooding caused by climate change are a 
threat to the security of the United States… 
H1: increase the 






A group of Democratic leaders in the House and Senate 
have recently argued that droughts and flooding caused 
by climate change are a threat to the security of the 
United States…. 
H3: increase 
impact for Dems, 






A group of Republican leaders in the House and Senate 
have recently argued that droughts and flooding caused 
by climate change are a threat to the security of the 
United States… 
H3: increase  
impact for 






A group of climate scientists have recently argued that 
droughts and flooding caused by climate change are a 






 (No source) 
(N=192) 
Some groups have recently argued that climate change 







A group of military leaders including generals and 
homeland security officers have recently argued that 









A group of Democratic leaders in the House and Senate 
have recently argued that climate change is a threat to 
the environment of the United States. 
H3: increase 
impact for Dems, 






A group of Republican leaders in the House and Senate 
have recently argued that climate change is a threat to 
the environment of the United States. 
H3: increase 
impact for 






A group of climate scientists have recently argued that 
climate change is a threat to the environment of the 
United States. 










Figure 1. Message Source Effects Relative to No Source Appeal’s Baseline 
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Table 2: Main Effects (Democrats only)  
 
 






















Military Leaders 0.28* 0.17 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.19 
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) 
Democrat Leaders -0.21 0.18* -0.22 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
 (0.19) (0.13) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) 
Republican Leaders -0.15 0.11 -0.36* 0.14 0.16 0.06 -0.25 
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) 
Climate Scientists 0.19 0.00 0.01 -0.18 -0.17 -0.24* 0.13 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.25) (0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.24) 
Constant (No-Source Nat. Sec.) 3.33*** 4.38*** 2.41*** 6.43*** 6.47*** 6.31*** 1.84*** 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.17) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.16) 
N 392 392 392 392 392 392 391 
Environmental Frame        
Military Leaders 0.57*** 0.10 -0.49** 0.04 0.05 0.10 -0.04 
 (0.19) (0.12) (0.25) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.22) 
Democrat Leaders 0.19 0.22** -0.19 -0.05 0.12 0.02 -0.11 
 (0.20) (0.13) (0.26) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23) 
Republican Leaders 0.21 0.09 -0.09 -0.13 -0.22* -0.02 0.23 
 (0.20) (0.12) (0.26) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) 
Climate Scientists 0.06 0.16* 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.23* 0.06 
 (0.20) (0.12) (0.26) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.22) 
Constant (No-Source Env.) 3.22*** 4.42*** 2.55*** 6.45*** 6.44*** 6.26*** 1.76*** 
 (0.14) (0.09) (0.18) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
N 422 422 421 422 421 422 422 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Conditions receiving the national security frame are compared to the No-
Source National Security baseline; conditions receiving the environmental frame are compared to the No-Source Environmental condition. Asterisks represent 
one-tailed p-values. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3: Main Effects (Republicans only) 
 
 






















Military Leaders 0.47** 0.01 -0.61** 0.13 -0.27 0.09 -0.61* 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.37) (0.36) (0.35) (0.34) (0.38) 
Democrat Leaders 0.19 -0.11 -0.50* 0.20 -0.44* -0.06 -0.29 
 (0.22) (0.24) (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.33) (0.37) 
Republican Leaders 0.22 -0.01 -0.96*** 0.18 0.09 -0.01 -0.51* 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.35) (0.39) 
Climate Scientists 0.12 -0.26 -0.23 -0.22 -0.32 0.05 -0.06 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.32) (0.36) 
Constant (No-Source Nat. Sec.) 2.09*** 3.16*** 4.82*** 4.55*** 4.91*** 4.85*** 4.07*** 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.27) 
N 287 287 288 288 288 287 287 
Environmental Frame        
Military Leaders 0.13 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.02 0.02 0.54* 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.32) (0.38) 
Democrat Leaders -0.21 -0.10 0.59* 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.60** 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.30) (0.36) 
Republican Leaders 0.18 0.50** -0.12 0.51* 0.43 0.60** -0.16 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.38) (0.36) (0.35) (0.31) (0.37) 
Climate Scientists 0.09 0.05 0.44 0.11 0.06 0.54** 0.43 
 (0.25) (0.26) (0.37) (0.35) (0.34) (0.31) (0.37) 
Constant (No-Source Env.) 2.48*** 3.08*** 4.24*** 4.76*** 4.80*** 4.82*** 3.52*** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.22) (0.27) 
N 274 274 271 273 273 274 273 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficient estimates, with standard errors in parentheses. Conditions receiving the national security frame are compared to the No-
Source National Security baseline; conditions receiving the environmental frame are compared to the No-Source Environmental condition. Asterisks represent 
one-tailed p-values. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 01.  
 
